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1. Constitutional principles and case law in judgment 142/2025
The Constitutional Court, through judgment no. 142 delivered on 31 July 2025, ruled on questions of constitutionality raised by four courts (Bologna, Rome, Milan and Florence) concerning unlimited iure sanguinis Italian citizenship. Specifically, the challenge concerned the provision of Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law 91/1992 (and its historical predecessors from 1865 and 1912) insofar as it recognises citizenship, without any generational limit, to the children of Italian citizens. The referring courts considered that unlimited transmission by descent — especially in favour of persons born and residing abroad for generations, without any effective link to Italy — might violate several constitutional principles:
- Art. 1, paragraph 2, of the Constitution (popular sovereignty): in their view, the absence of limits would empty of content the concept of the "people" to whom sovereignty belongs, diluting it with millions of merely formal citizens. Citizenship, they argue, has an intrinsic communal dimension of belonging, integration and proximity, which would be compromised by unlimited ius sanguinis.
- Art. 3 of the Constitution (equality and reasonableness): the absence of effective conditions for descendants abroad would be unreasonable and disproportionate, creating a disparity with respect to other routes to citizenship which, by contrast, require a concrete link (for example, marriage or residence require years of residence, knowledge of the language, etc.). In other words, those born abroad obtain (under the law then in force) citizenship without effort or connection, while a foreigner residing in Italy or the spouse of an Italian must meet strict requirements — a disparity considered unjustified.
- Art. 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution (international and European obligations): the referring courts invoked the international principle of the "genuine link" between the individual and the State, arguing that citizenship cannot be reduced to a fictio iuris devoid of real belonging. They also noted that EU citizenship automatically derives from Italian citizenship (Art. 20 TFEU), so that Italy confers European rights (free movement, diplomatic protection, etc.) on a potentially unlimited number of persons who lack any connection with the country. This could infringe EU obligations, in light of the precedents of the Court of Justice censuring national citizenship laws lacking proportionality or individual examination.
In reaching its decision, the Court first reiterated the limits of its role with regard to legislative discretion. It excluded the possibility of "inventing" on its own a connecting criterion by introducing ex officio a generational or other limit: "An intervention by the Court [...] limiting the acquisition of citizenship by descent, through a manipulative judgment operating choices among multiple possible options, characterised by a wide margin of discretion and [...] incisive repercussions on the system, is not admissible". In other words, it is for Parliament to decide whether and how to impose limits on ius sanguinis, since there are many possible solutions (two generations, residence requirements, cultural requirements, etc.), all with far-reaching implications. The Court's task, instead, is only to verify that the rules in force do not use criteria "wholly extraneous" to constitutional principles or contrary to them.
On the merits, the Court recognised the full legitimacy of the principle of unlimited ius sanguinis, as set out in Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law 91/1992. It observed that the referring courts themselves did not challenge the suitability of the filiation link as such to found the acquisition of citizenship. Accordingly, the mere fact of being children of Italian citizens (the status filiationis) was held to be a criterion neither unreasonable nor extraneous to constitutional values. The Court was clear: Italian citizenship is transmitted by blood, without generational limits and without the need to prove residence, culture, language or other active ties with Italy. It expressly reiterated that the 1992 provision — "a child of an Italian father or mother is an Italian citizen by birth" — is fully in conformity with the Constitution. The blood link is therefore, from a constitutional standpoint, a justified and sufficient criterion for identifying who is part of the Italian people.
The Court therefore rejected all objections of unconstitutionality directed against ius sanguinis. In its ruling, it declared the questions raised inadmissible or unfounded, confirming the validity of the challenged provisions. In particular: the objections based on Art. 1 of the Constitution (popular sovereignty) and Art. 117 of the Constitution were held inadmissible for lack of specificity: the Constitution does not directly define "who the people are," nor is there any international obligation breached by the absence of generational limits (no EU rule or treaty imposes a "genuine link" for granting citizenship). Notable in this respect is the passage in which the Court observes that the constitutional "people" coincides with the body of citizens, so that it is the law that defines citizenship and not the other way round. Article 1 of the Constitution therefore does not provide an autonomous parameter to limit legislative discretion in matters of citizenship; rather, it is the law that gives substance to the republican people.
As for the alleged unequal treatment (Art. 3 of the Constitution), the Court held it unfounded: the differences between ius sanguinis and other forms of acquisition (marriage, residence) do not violate equality because these are not homogeneous situations. In other words, a descendant of Italians abroad is not in the same situation as a foreigner residing in Italy or a foreign spouse, so it is legitimate for the legislature to provide for different routes. The Court also recalled that it had already intervened in the past to eliminate genuinely unreasonable criteria in matters of citizenship — for example, declaring illegitimate the rule causing loss of the naturalisation process through marriage in the event of the death of the Italian spouse during the procedure. In the case of ius sanguinis, however, transmission by descent did not appear to be an arbitrary criterion or one lacking constitutional foundation.
Finally, the Court clarified the scope of its decision with regard to recent legislative developments. Since, in the meantime (between the referral of the questions and the decision), a reform of citizenship had entered into force — Decree-Law 36/2025, converted into Law 74/2025 — some of the parties involved had asked the Court to rule also on these new provisions. However, the Constitutional Court declined, clarifying that the "intervening legislation" did not apply to the proceedings in question and therefore fell outside the thema decidendum. Judgment 142/2025 concerns exclusively the regulatory framework previously in force (i.e., Law 91/1992 before the reform) and cases pending before 2025. Nevertheless, the principles established have a general scope and inevitably project onto the new regulatory context, as discussed in the following points.
2. Practical implications for the application of the reform (Law No. 74/2025)
Law No. 74 of 23 May 2025 (converting with amendments Decree-Law 36/2025, known as the "Tajani Decree") introduced the first organic reform of citizenship by descent since the entry into force of the 1992 law. This reform, in force since 24 May 2025, does not abolish the principle of ius sanguinis, but "softens" it with conditions intended to ensure an effective link with the national community. In particular, the new Article 1, paragraph 1, of Law 91/1992 (as amended) provides that persons born abroad who hold another citizenship at birth do not automatically acquire Italian citizenship. In other words, the child of Italian citizens born outside the borders no longer becomes a citizen merely by virtue of having Italian blood, if he or she simultaneously holds the citizenship of the foreign State in which he or she was born. This exclusion also applies retroactively to persons born abroad before the entry into force of the law, subject to certain transitional exceptions:
- "Safeguard" exceptions: The previous rules (automatic transmission) continue to apply if, before 27 March 2025, the status of Italian citizen had already been recognised, or if the person concerned had already obtained an appointment to submit an application for recognition, or if judicial proceedings had been initiated before that date. In practice, those with proceedings already under way at the time the decree-law was enacted are not affected by the new rule.
- Exceptions based on a close link: The new law also does not apply if one of the applicant's parents or grandparents held exclusively Italian citizenship (i.e., did not hold dual nationality), or if one of the parents (or adoptive parents) has legally resided in Italy for at least two consecutive years after acquiring Italian citizenship and before the birth (or adoption) of the child. These clauses tend to safeguard situations in which the link with Italy is more direct: for example, if the emigrant parent never naturalised abroad (retaining only Italian citizenship), or returned to live in Italy for a significant period before having children.
The reform has also introduced new mechanisms for acquisition "by operation of law" aimed at minor descendants abroad: paragraphs 1-bis and 1-ter provide that a minor foreign or stateless child, born to Italian citizens, may acquire Italian nationality through a declaration of will by the parents, provided that he or she resides in Italy for at least two years (alternatively, the declaration may be made within one year of birth, thereby avoiding the residence requirement). The minor child of a person who reacquires or obtains citizenship may also acquire it, but only if he or she has resided in Italy continuously for at least two years at the time the parent becomes a citizen. These are measures intended to root young descendants in Italy, rather than automatically recognising iure sanguinis. Law 74/2025 also established, in Article 1, paragraph 2, evidentiary restrictions in citizenship cases (prohibiting recourse to oaths or witnesses, save for exceptions, and placing on the applicant the burden of proving the absence of causes of loss or non-acquisition), in order to make verification of the requirements more rigorous.
Alongside these restrictions, the legislature introduced facilitations to encourage the return of descendants and remedy past injustices. For example, the new Article 1-bis allows descendants of Italians in traditional countries of emigration to enter Italy for work outside the quota system (exempt from annual limits on labour immigration), and reduces from 3 to 2 years the residence required for naturalisation if the applicant has a parent or grandparent who is an Italian citizen by birth. Furthermore, Article 1-ter opens a window until 31/12/2027 for the reacquisition of citizenship for former citizens born in Italy (or resident there for at least 2 years) who lost it under the provisions of the 1912 law (for example, women who lost it through marriage or emigrants who had to renounce it). These are remedial measures aimed at those who, despite being of Italian origin, were penalised by now-obsolete provisions.
In light of judgment no. 142/2025, what are the practical implications of this reform? First, it must be clarified that the decision of the Constitutional Court did not annul or amend any provision of Law 74/2025, since, as noted, the new legislation was not the direct subject of the ruling. Accordingly, all the provisions of the reform remain fully in force, and the administrations (municipalities, consulates) must apply them. For example, from 24 May 2025 onward, persons born abroad to Italian parents (and acquiring another nationality at birth) will not be registered as Italian citizens, unless the exceptions described above apply. Similarly, applications for recognition iure sanguinis submitted after 28 March 2025 will be rejected if these requirements are not met (unless the applicant can invoke a right acquired before that date). From an operational standpoint, therefore, the Court's judgment imposes no immediate change in procedures: it has preserved the status quo prior to the reform, but in the meantime, the reforming law has already changed the rules.
Nevertheless, judgment 142/2025, by confirming the full constitutional legitimacy of the former unlimited regime, has a bearing on the debate over the validity of the new law. In essence, the Court has held that the absence of generational limits was not unconstitutional (without prejudice, however, to the legislature's power to introduce them). This may be read in two ways: on one hand, it legitimises the political decision to maintain pure ius sanguinis; on the other, it in no way excludes the opposite decision to limit it, provided this does not entail a violation of other principles. The broad legislative discretion in this field, affirmed by the Court, implies that Parliament may legitimately establish new criteria (as it has done with Law 74/2025), provided these are not "criteria wholly extraneous to constitutional principles." The crucial question therefore is: do the specific restrictions introduced by Law 74/2025 respect constitutional principles or not? On this point, the Court has not explicitly ruled (deferring to future judgments), but some passages of the judgment and the initial analysis by experts point to possible problematic aspects of the reform.
In particular, two aspects of the new legislation are the focus of attention:
- Discrimination based on the ancestor's dual nationality: The rule whereby only descendants of ancestors with "exclusive" Italian nationality may continue to acquire Italian nationality iure sanguinis appears to some an arbitrary criterion, potentially "extraneous" to constitutional values. Indeed, it creates two categories of persons of Italian origin: on one hand, descendants of Italians who never naturalised abroad (favoured), and on the other, descendants of Italians who became citizens of another country (disfavoured). This element of "purism" — whereby the presence of dual nationality in the family line cuts off the right — has been described by some as an almost "eugenic" view of the law of citizenship. The Court, although not directly addressing this rule, emphasised that the Constitution outlines an idea of community that is open, pluralist and respectful of minorities. In this sense, disadvantaging precisely those who hold a dual cultural and legal identity (Italian and foreign) could prove contrary to this pluralist spirit. One jurist has observed that the solution of denying citizenship to descendants solely because the ancestor naturalised elsewhere appears "wholly unprecedented and contrary" to the constitutional vision of inclusiveness. This would amount to discrimination based on so-called biplody (dual nationality), which could violate the principle of substantive equality (Art. 3 of the Constitution) and perhaps also the right to personal identity (Art. 2 of the Constitution). On this point, the constitutionality of the amended Article 1, paragraph 1 of Law 91/1992 is not self-evident and is likely to come under scrutiny.
- Retroactivity and collective loss of status: Law 74/2025 has retroactive effect on persons born abroad before its entry into force, depriving them (ex post) of the citizenship they would have acquired by birth under the previous law, unless they had already begun proceedings or fall within the exceptions. Indeed, as critics point out, this amounts to a "mass legal disinheritance" of millions of descendants of Italians born decades ago. This kind of automatic and collective loss of civil status, occurring without any assessment of individual cases, raises doubts as to its legitimacy both domestically and at the European level. The principle of legitimate expectation could be undermined: persons who for years were considered (and considered themselves) Italian citizens iure sanguinis under the law then in force see that status disappear without any adequate transition. Those who submitted their application on 26 March 2025 are recognised as Italian, while those who submitted it a few days later are excluded: a very sharp temporal disparity, described as unjust and "contrary to the principles of the rule of law" by jurists. In constitutional terms, this brings into play the principle of reasonableness (Art. 3) and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship (Art. 22 of the Constitution): the latter article, although referring to political cases, expresses the guarantee that citizenship cannot be lightly or retroactively removed. Moreover, at the European level, the Constitutional Court cited the case law of the Court of Justice according to which national rules entailing loss of EU citizen status must provide for an individual examination of the consequences for the person concerned. In our case, the reform affects the European status of an entire category (descendants born abroad with dual nationality) without any case-by-case assessment, which could conflict with the principles of proportionality and protection of EU rights. Jurists note that general measures revoking or retroactively denying citizenship "indiscriminately and collectively" may infringe EU law, potentially giving rise to actions before the Court of Justice or the ECtHR.
In short, judgment 142/2025 did not invalidate the reform, but laid the conceptual groundwork for assessing its constitutionality. And indeed, the matter did not end there: the judicial battle is set to continue. The Court of Turin has already raised the question of the constitutionality of Law 74/2025 (probably concerning some of the aspects mentioned above), and the Constitutional Court has set a hearing in February 2026 to examine it. It will be on that occasion that the Constitutional Court will judge whether the new "limits" introduced withstand constitutional scrutiny. In the meantime, the practical application of Law 74/2025 continues, but with a question mark over its viability: on one hand, the Government maintains that it strengthens the idea of substantive citizenship and overcomes past distortions; on the other, legal experts and the affected communities denounce various critical issues that could lead to a (total or partial) rejection of the reform by the courts.
3. Critical reading: political-social context and reactions to the judgment
In the photo: a moment from the conference held on 29 May 2025 at the Chamber of Deputies, organised by the association "Natitaliani" with opposition members of parliament, jurists and representatives of Italian communities abroad, to denounce the citizenship reform as the "law of shame" and "mass disinheritance."
The citizenship reform (L.74/2025) and the subsequent judgment of the Constitutional Court sit at the centre of a heated political and social debate. On one hand is the perspective of the Government and the majority, who promoted the tightening of ius sanguinis; on the other, opposition forces, associations of Italians abroad, and many jurists, who have strongly contested the measure, welcoming the principles affirmed by the Court.
The Government's position. The reform was passed in 2025 by the centre-right executive (then led by Giorgia Meloni), with a key role played by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani, to the point that Decree-Law 36/2025 was colloquially dubbed the "Tajani Decree." The declared aim was to make the citizenship link more "serious" and genuine, putting an end to possible abuses. Tajani stressed that ius sanguinis is retained, but "with precise limits, above all to avoid abuses or phenomena of 'commercialisation' of Italian passports. Citizenship must be something serious." References to "abuses" allude to cases of opaque business connected with recognition procedures (intermediaries, companies organising mass procedures for distant descendants), as well as to the fact that the desire to obtain Italian citizenship was sometimes motivated more by easy access to the EU than by any genuine sense of belonging. "Let us make Italian citizenship something very serious," Tajani declared when presenting the decree on 28 March 2025. According to the Government's narrative, the reform was necessary to give value to citizenship: Italy would continue to recognise it for emigrant descendants, but only for those still linked to the national community (directly or through personal investment), avoiding treating as "Italian" persons who for generations had been fully integrated elsewhere. The Government also stressed that consulates were overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of ius sanguinis applications mainly from Latin America, with waiting times of decades: the introduction of connecting criteria was seen as a way of streamlining procedures and reducing litigation in the courts. At the parliamentary level, the centre-right majority unanimously supported conversion of the decree; however, it should be noted that some representatives elected abroad on the majority's lists expressed discomfort. For example, MP Luis Roberto Lorenzato (Lega, elected in South America), although he voted in favour of the measure, welcomed judgment 142/2025, stating "We were born Italian" in support of unlimited ius sanguinis. This reflects a certain internal division: the Government's official line is one of identity rigour ("enough with abuses, citizenship is not given away"), but some representatives of the overseas constituency (even from within the governing camp) have had to take account of the discontent of their constituents of Italian origin.
(Carducci refers to case law which over the years has eliminated discrimination against emigrant Italians — for example, allowing, since as early as 1966, maternal transmission of citizenship to children born before 1948, through the Court's constitutionally oriented interpretation). Ultimately, according to these scholars, Law 74/2025 breaks the ideal pact with the Italian diaspora, disowning the country's migratory history and risking isolating Italy within a narrow nationalist vision.
The opposition and Italian communities abroad. The reaction of minority political forces and emigrant associations has been highly critical. Already during the conversion process, members of the Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement (as well as formations representing Italians abroad, such as MAIE) denounced the nature of the reform. At a conference held at the Chamber of Deputies on 29 May 2025, significantly titled "An Attack on Global Italy and Citizenship Rights," MP Fabio Porta (PD, elected in Latin America) spoke of "a historic and legal rupture with the Italy of emigration," defining the new law as the expression of a "closed identitarian sovereignism" that disowns the plurality of Italian identity in the world. Porta and others have highlighted the inconsistency of celebrating, on one hand, the Turismo delle Radici (2024 was proclaimed the "Year of Italian Roots" by the MAECI to encourage people of Italian origin to rediscover Italy), while, on the other, cutting off roots with this law. Numerous associations of Italians abroad (from the Comites and the CGIE to emigrant circles in various countries) have officially taken a stand against the reform, calling it punitive and unconstitutional. The Comites of Switzerland, for example, in a joint document, spoke of a "punitive and unconstitutional" law creating second-class citizens and reaffirmed their commitment to a citizenship "that unites, not divides." Similar protests have arisen from the Comites of other countries (for example, the Comites of Geneva has publicly condemned the changes as "restrictive and penalising" - La Notizia, 24/6/2025). In the media, newspapers aimed at Italians abroad (such as the portal Italianismo, the newspaper Gente d'Italia, the FUSIE network, etc.) have published very harsh headlines: "Law 74/2025, the trap against Global Italy," "decree of shame," "eugenic citizenship" — a sign of great indignation within the diaspora.
Critical legal arguments. Numerous experts in constitutional and international law have supported the arguments of the applicants. Professor Roberta Calvano has questioned the use of a decree-law in such a structural matter (absence of the requirements of necessity and urgency, depriving Parliament of its functions). Professor Giovanni Bonato coined the striking expression "mass legal disinheritance" to describe the collective deprivation of the rights of Latin American descendants, for whom Italian citizenship is also a symbol of cultural identity. Lawyer Marco Mellone and Professor Alessandro Brutti (AGIS association - iure sanguinis jurists) illustrated the unconstitutional aspects, which include: violation of legitimate expectation, of the principle of proportionality, of equal treatment among citizens, and even of Article 22 of the Constitution (which prohibits depriving anyone of citizenship for political reasons or arbitrarily). They argued that the reform transforms citizenship from an original right into a discretionary concession, tied to territorial and retroactive elements, and that this opens the way to appeals both domestically and before European courts. In particular, the precedent of the Court of Justice of the EU (Tjebbes and Others case) was cited, which rejects national rules on loss of citizenship without individual assessment. Professor Giacomo De Federico stressed precisely that revocation (or denial) of citizenship for persons with dual nationality without examining each individual case conflicts with EU law and could expose the State to claims for damages and discrimination by those excluded. It has also been noted that there is an Italian paradox: on one hand, citizenship is not easily granted to immigrants who live and work stably in Italy (lack of reform of ius soli or ius scholae), while on the other it is withdrawn from those of Italian origin born elsewhere — an identitarian closure on both fronts which, according to constitutional scholar Alfonso Celotto, is "short-sighted and self-destructive." Another constitutional scholar, Nicola Carducci, recalled the spirit of Article 35 of the Constitution, which protects Italian workers abroad: the new law, in his view, contradicts it because it ignores the tradition of protection towards emigrants and their descendants, as well as "the historic judgments of the Constitutional Court recognising persons of Italian origin as fully Italian."
Reception of judgment 142/2025. In this tense climate, the decision of the Constitutional Court was welcomed by communities abroad and by the opposition, while the Government interpreted it more neutrally. Organisations of persons of Italian origin spoke of a "historic victory": the newspaper Fatti Nostri ran the headline that the Constitutional Court confirms that "the blood link is sufficient" and defends Italians born abroad without current ties. Representatives such as Fabio Porta declared that, in practice, the Court had "overturned the Government's decision" (although technically this is not the case, the political meaning is clear). The interpretation of majority representatives has been the opposite: they have stressed that the Court did not reject the reform at all (since it did not examine it) and have emphasised the part of the judgment recognising the legislature's broad margin. In practice, the Government has maintained that the judgment does not affect the Tajani reform, while the opposition and the committees of Italians abroad interpret it as a strong warning in favour of persons of Italian origin, which would pave the way for invalidating the harshest parts.
There is one element uniting everyone: judgment 142/2025 relaunches the parliamentary debate. The Constitutional Court itself, although it rejected the questions, posed a crucial question to the legislature, describing as "urgent" the need to find a new balance and passing "the ball" to Parliament. Following the judgment, several political leaders expressed a desire to reopen the debate on citizenship. Some opposition members of parliament have introduced bills to soften or repeal the restrictions of Law 74/2025, while sectors of the majority (in particular those elected abroad for the centre-right) are pressing for corrective measures broadening the exceptions or extending the deadlines for applications.
In conclusion, the matter continues to evolve. Judgment no. 142/2025 has confirmed traditional principles (unlimited ius sanguinis = constitutionally legitimate) and has established some important interpretive limits (broad but not arbitrary discretion, respect for the open and pluralist nature of the national community, prohibition of unreasonable criteria). It has given new impetus to the claims of Italian communities abroad, who now feel more protected in their historic rights of belonging. On the other hand, it has warned the legislature: if limits are truly to be introduced, this must be done with attention to constitutional principles and EU constraints, in order to avoid rejection. As Claudia Antonini, vice-president of Natitaliani, stated, the fight against Law 74/2025 is "a battle that has only just begun": at stake is not merely a technical question, but "the heart of Italy, which has built bridges around the world and now risks raising walls." The coming stages (the Constitutional Court's ruling on the reform in 2026, possible corrective legislative interventions) will show whether a balance will be restored, with a citizenship that continues to unite Italians within and beyond the country's borders, in keeping with the Constitution and national history.
Sources: Corte Cost. judgment 142/2025 (filed 31/7/2025); Law 23/05/2025 no. 74 (Official Gazette no. 118/2025); Constitutional Court press release 31/7/2025; Diritto.it, 1/8/2025; Fatti Nostri, 1/8/2025; Corriere d'Italia, 6/6/2025; Adnkronos, 31/7/2025; ANSA, 28/3/2025.
